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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Robert Ray Ferguson asserts the district court committed fundamental
error by failing to inquire into his understanding of the consequences of a persistent violator
sentencing enhancement before accepting his admissions to two prior felony convictions.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Right after the jury verdict in his trial, and without the district court inquiring into his
understanding of the consequences, Mr. Ferguson admitted to two prior felony convictions.
Those  admissions  exposed  him  to  a  life  sentence.   Based  on  his  admissions,  the  district  court
found Mr. Ferguson was a persistent violator and imposed a sentence of fifteen years to life.
Mr. Ferguson had dropped out of school after eleventh grade, to help support his family.
(See Presentence Report, Apr. 20, 2012 (hereinafter, PSI), p.10.)1  He struggled with depression,
and often used alcohol and illegal drugs to self-medicate.  (See PSI, pp.11-12.)  He met
Julie  Snow  at  a  homeless  shelter.   (See Tr., p.149, Ls.15-18.)  They began a relationship and
moved into a motel room.  (See Tr., p.150, Ls.3-14, p.170, Ls.18-25.)  The allegations against
Mr. Ferguson stemmed from an altercation that happened when Ms. Snow invited one of her
friends to the motel room.  (See generally Tr., pp.149-69, 191-215, 263-90.)
The jury in Mr. Ferguson’s trial convicted him of felony aggravated battery2 and use of a
deadly weapon during the commission of a crime.3  (Tr., p.329, L.21 – p.330, L.10.)
Mr. Ferguson was emotional after the jury verdict.  The district court recognized that; following
his admissions to the prior felony convictions, the district court thanked Mr. Ferguson and told
1 The PSI was from one of Mr. Ferguson’s prior cases, Ada County No. CR 2011-18003.
2 I.C. §§ 18-903(a) and 18-907(b).
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him, “I don’t mean to torture you with all of this. . . .  I know it has been an emotional verdict for
you.”  (See Tr., p.336, Ls.20-25.)
Immediately after the jury verdict, Mr. Ferguson requested that the district court poll the
jury.  (Tr., p.330, Ls.14-18.)  One by one, each juror confirmed that the guilty verdict was their
personal and true verdict.  (Tr., p.330, L.19 – p.332, L.10.)
After polling the jury, the district court told them, “I am going to impose upon you to
remain in the jury room for ten more minutes for reasons that I will come and explain to you
personally.  But I do need you to stick around for approximately 10 to 15 more minutes at the
end of this long day.”  (Tr., p.332, Ls.11-18.)  The jury exited the courtroom, and Mr. Ferguson
requested that the district court not order a PSI.  (See Tr., p.332, L.19 – p.333, L.19.)  The district
court declined to order a PSI, and scheduled the sentencing hearing.  (See Tr.,  p.333,  L.20  –
p.334, L.5.)
The district court then turned right away to the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement,4 stating, “Mr. Ferguson, the State alleges that you are a persistent violator of the
law.  As you know, you have the right to have the State prove those convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  (Tr., p.334, Ls.6-9.)  The district court asked him, “[h]ave you talked to your
attorney about that,” and he replied, “[y]es, ma’am.”  (Tr., p.334, Ls.10-12.)
The district court informed Mr. Ferguson, “[a]nd I have got the jury waiting, as you heard
me  tell  them  to  wait.   If  you  want  the  State  to  prove  this,  I  will  bring  them  back.   It’s  not  a
problem.”  (Tr., p.334, Ls.13-16.)  He answered, “[n]o, ma’am.”  (Tr., p.334, L.17.)
The district court placed Mr. Ferguson under oath.  (Tr., p.334, Ls.18-20.)  The district
court asked him:  “The State alleges that, on or about the 27th of June, 2012, that you were
3 I.C. § 19-2520.
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convicted of the crime of aggravated assault, a felony, in Ada County, Idaho, in Case No. CR-
FR-2011-0018003.  Do you admit or deny the allegation?”  (Tr., p.335, Ls.3-7.)  The district
court also asked Mr. Ferguson:  “And the State also alleges that, on or about March 30, 2000,
that you were convicted of the crime of battery with a deadly weapon, a felony, in Washoe, or
Washoe County, Nevada, Case No. CR-992330.  Do you admit or deny that allegation?”
(Tr., p.335, Ls.9-14.)  Mr. Ferguson admitted to both allegations.  (Tr., p.335, Ls.8, 15.)
After the admissions, the district court showed Mr. Ferguson the judgments of conviction
from  those  prior  cases.   (See Tr., p.335, L.16 – p.336, L.19.)  However, over the course of
Mr. Ferguson’s admissions, the district court did not inform him of his right not to testify.  (See
generally Tr., p.332, L.20 – p.336, L.25.)  While the district court confirmed Mr. Ferguson had
spoken with his attorney about the persistent violator sentencing enhancement, it did not inquire
into  what  his  attorney  had  advised  him.   (See Tr., p.334, Ls.6-11.)  The district court had
mentioned the potential consequences of being found a persistent violator at a pretrial conference
some two weeks prior, when the State sought leave to file the enhancement.  (See Tr., p.24, L.22
– p.25, L.8.)  But before Mr. Ferguson admitted to the prior felony convictions, the district court
did not inquire into whether he understood the enhancement would increase his sentence by at
least five years, and expose him to a life sentence.  (See Tr., p.334, L.6 – p.335, L.15.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that Mr. Ferguson had “admitted the
underlying two felony predicates that form the basis for the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement.”  (Tr., p.361, Ls.8-11.)  The district court’s judgment of conviction stated
Mr. Ferguson was guilty of being a persistent violator.  (R., p.128.)  The district court imposed
4 I.C. § 19-2514.
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upon him a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with fifteen years fixed.  (R., pp.127-31;
Tr., p.361, Ls.12-25.)5
Mr. Ferguson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment.  (R., pp.135-37.)
5 For the use of a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement, the district court imposed a separate
sentence of five years fixed, concurrent with the sentence for aggravated battery.  (See R., p.128;
Tr., p.362, Ls.15-25.)  However, “enhancements are not considered to be a new offense for
which there is a separate sentence.  Rather, the enhancement is an additional term and is part of a
single sentence for the underlying crime.” State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 658-59 (1999).  To
date, Mr. Ferguson has not filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
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ISSUE
When Mr. Ferguson admitted to his prior felony convictions, did the district court commit
fundamental error by failing to inquire into his understanding of the consequences of a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement before accepting the admissions?
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ARGUMENT
When Mr. Ferguson Admitted To His Prior Felony Convictions, The District Court Committed
Fundamental Error By Failing To Inquire Into His Understanding Of The Consequences Of A
Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement Before Accepting The Admissions
A. Introduction
Mr. Ferguson asserts that when he admitted to his prior felony convictions, the district
court committed fundamental error by failing to inquire into his understanding of the
consequences of a persistent violator sentencing enhancement before accepting the admissions.
The district court’s failure to inquire violated Mr. Ferguson’s unwaived constitutional right to
due process.  This error plainly exists, and was not harmless.
B. Standard Of Review
Although Mr. Ferguson did not object before the district court to the failure to inquire
(see generally Tr., pp.332-36), this Court may review the issue under the fundamental error
doctrine.  Review for fundamental error involves a three-pronged inquiry where the defendant
must show the appellate court that the alleged error:  (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
C. The  District  Court’s  Failure  To  Inquire  Into  Mr.  Ferguson’s  Understanding  Of  The
Consequences Before Accepting His Admissions Violated His Unwaived Constitutional
Right To Due Process
Mr. Ferguson asserts that the district court’s failure to inquire into his understanding of
the consequences before accepting his admissions violated his unwaived constitutional right to
due  process.   The  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  provides  that  no
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State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
When the State seeks a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, the defendant is
entitled to a jury trial on the State’s allegation of previous felony convictions. State v. Dunn, 44
Idaho 636, 640 (1927).  In State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held, “[w]e are persuaded that due process principles preclude the acceptance of a
stipulation to the truth of persistent violator allegations without judicial inquiry to determine that
the defendant makes the admission voluntarily and with an understanding of the consequences.”
Id. at 418.  The Cheatham Court concluded:
Although we do not deem a full [Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)] litany
to be necessary, we hold that a stipulation to the truth of a persistent violator
allegation will be valid only if the record shows that the defendant entered into the
stipulation voluntarily in the sense that the defendant was not coerced, and
knowingly in the sense that the defendant understands the potential sentencing
consequences.
Id.
In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court outlined the standards to ensure that a guilty
plea is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44.  The Boykin Court
held,  “[i]t  was  error,  plain  on  the  face  of  the  record,  for  the  trial  judge  to  accept  petitioner’s
guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” Id. at 242.  The
Court discussed how “[s]everal federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes
place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial”; namely, the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers.
Id. at  243.   The Boykin Court  stated,  “[w]e  cannot  presume  a  waiver  of  these  three  important
federal rights from a silent record.”
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The Boykin Court also noted it had previously held that “if a defendant’s guilty plea is not
equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore
void.” Id. at 243 n.5 (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)).  According
to the Court, “[w]hat is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he
has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Id. at 243-44.
What is at stake for a defendant facing a persistent violator sentencing enhancement
demands  similar  solicitude.   The Cheatham Court observed that, “[u]nder Idaho law, the
detriment from being found a persistent violator is dramatic.  Idaho Code § 19-2514 mandates
that a persistent violator be sentenced to not less than five years’ imprisonment and authorizes up
to life imprisonment, regardless of the maximum sentence otherwise fixed by statute for the new
offense.” Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 418.  “The defendant may be subject to a sentence ‘many
times as great as that prescribed by statute for the offense.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lovejoy, 60
Idaho 632, 638 (1939)).  The Court then stated, “[a] waiver of the right to trial on a recidivist
charge therefore ought not be treated lightly.” Id.
Thus, the due process principles identified by the Cheatham Court apply here, even
though Mr. Ferguson admitted to the prior felony convictions rather than have counsel stipulate
to them.  Like the defendant in Cheatham,  Mr.  Ferguson  essentially  waived  his  right  to  a  jury
trial on the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (See Tr., p.334, Ls.6-17.)  His
admissions  allowed  the  district  court  to  find  he  was  a  persistent  violator,  exposing  him  to  the
dramatic detriment of a potential life sentence. See Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 418.  Thus,
Mr. Ferguson’s admissions were not valid unless the record shows he entered them “voluntarily
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in the sense that the defendant was not coerced, and knowingly in the sense that the defendant
understands the potential sentencing consequences.” See id.
The record here does not show that Mr. Ferguson admitted to the prior felony convictions
with an understanding of the potential consequences of a persistent violator sentencing
enhancement, because the district court did not inquire into his understanding.  The district court
examined Mr. Ferguson without asking him if he understood the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement would increase his sentence by at least five years, and expose him to a potential life
sentence.  (See generally Tr., pp.334-36.)  Rather, the district court’s questions to Mr. Ferguson
focused on the prior judgments.  (See Tr., p.335, L.3 – p.336, L.11.)  Although the district court
asked Mr. Ferguson if he had talked to his attorney about the enhancement (see Tr., p.334, Ls.10-
11), the district court did not have him elaborate on what exactly he had discussed with counsel
before putting him under oath (see Tr., p.334, Ls.12-20).  In sum, while the district court wanted
to make “absolutely sure” that Mr. Ferguson had an opportunity to review the prior judgments
(Tr., p.336, Ls.12-16), it failed to ensure that he understood the consequences of his admissions.
Thus, the district court’s failure to inquire violated Mr. Ferguson’s unwaived constitutional right
to due process. See Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 418.
D. The Error Plainly Exists
Mr. Ferguson asserts the district court’s error in failing to inquire plainly exists, without
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at
228.  Even assuming Mr. Ferguson sought to avoid going through a second part of the jury trial,
that would not have obviated his constitutional right to due process when he admitted to the prior
convictions and the district court accepted the admissions.  Further, the record does not indicate
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Mr. Ferguson’s counsel made a tactical decision to have the district court fail to inquire into his
client’s understanding of the consequences of a persistent violator sentencing enhancement,
considering  the  admissions  exposed  Mr.  Ferguson  to  a  potential  life  sentence.   Thus,  the  error
here plainly exists.
E. The Error Was Not Harmless
Mr. Ferguson asserts the district court’s error in failing to inquire into his understanding
of the consequences of a persistent violator sentencing enhancement before accepting the
admissions was not harmless. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  As discussed above, being a
persistent violator increases a defendant’s sentence by at least five years, and exposes the
defendant to a potential life sentence.  I.C. § 19-2514.
Here, Mr. Ferguson would not have been exposed to a life sentence without the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement.  The maximum penalty for the underlying offense, felony
aggravated battery, is fifteen years imprisonment.  I.C. § 18-908.  The use of a deadly weapon
sentencing enhancement increases “the maximum sentence authorized for the crime for which
the person was convicted by fifteen (15) years.”  I.C. § 19-2520.
Put  otherwise,  the  maximum  penalty  for  aggravated  battery  with  a  use  of  a  deadly
weapon sentencing enhancement is thirty years imprisonment.  Thus, without the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement, Mr. Ferguson would not have been exposed to a life sentence.
The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with fifteen years
fixed.  (R., p.128.)  Therefore, the district court’s error in failing to inquire into Mr. Ferguson’s
understanding of the consequences of a persistent violator sentencing enhancement before
accepting the admissions was not harmless.
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The district court’s failure to inquire violated Mr. Ferguson’s unwaived constitutional
right to due process.  This error plainly exists, and was not harmless.  Thus, Mr. Ferguson has
shown the district court committed fundamental error by failing to inquire into his understanding
of the consequences of a persistent violator sentencing enhancement before accepting his
admissions. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  Mr. Ferguson’s sentence should be vacated, and the
matter should be remanded to the district court to readdress the persistent violator allegations,
including conducting a trial on those allegations if necessary, and for subsequent resentencing.
See Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 418-19.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Ferguson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
sentence and remand the matter to the district court for resentencing, following a trial or other
proper disposition of the persistent violator allegations.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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